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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Richard Pena appeals, asserting that the district court erred by admitting, over
his objection, testimony of officers’ observations of his other, unrelated acts (driving on
other occasions the car in which officers ultimately found a gun Mr. Pena could not
lawfully possess) under Idaho Rule of Evidence (I.R.E.) 404(b).

He contends the

recognition testimony was not relevant to any non-propensity purpose that was actually
at issue in this case and the prejudicial impact of that evidence substantially outweighed
its accordingly-minimal probative value.
The State makes several responses to this argument which all misunderstand,
and so, are contrary to, the relevant facts and precedent. As a result, this Court should
reject those arguments, vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this case for
further proceedings.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Pena’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Whether the district court erred by determining the evidence of Mr. Pena’s prior
encounters with police was admissible under I.R.E. 404(b).
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Determining The Evidence Of Mr. Pena’s Prior Encounters
With Police Was Admissible Under I.R.E. 404(b)
A.

Mr. Pena’s Argument As To The Cumulative Nature Of The Recognition
Testimony Is Properly Presented On Appeal
The State argues that Mr. Pena did not advance a “cumulative evidence”

argument below, just an “improper comment on 404(b)” argument. (Resp. Br., p.12.)
The transcript of the arguments shows the State is mistaken. Part of the discussion in
limine (pre-testimony, but post-opening-statements) of whether the officers’ testimony
about their prior observations of Mr. Pena should be admitted, was as follows:
[Prosecutor]: I anticipate at least two officers [testifying to] having seen
him in that precise vehicle before.
[Defense Counsel]: Judge, we’re not disagreeing this is his car and he
drives it, so I don’t see how that is a rebuttal to -- an assertion that he also
loans it out. And I do think that that is an improper comment on 404(b).
(Tr., p.171, Ls.11-18.) Thus, what defense counsel was arguing is that the proffered
testimony about those other acts was irrelevant because the relevant facts had been
conceded (i.e., the proffered evidence is cumulative to the concession), and so, that
testimony was inadmissible under I.R.E. 404(b). (See also Tr., p.150, Ls.1-3, p.152,
Ls.6-8 (defense counsel revealing that point had been conceded during her opening
statement).) It is not clear how else the State would characterize that argument about
the relevancy of the proffered evidence. Therefore, the cumulative evidence argument
was made below.
At worst, this is a situation where the challenge was not formally raised, but was
nevertheless discussed by the parties and the court. (See Tr., p.170, L.24 - p.173,
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L.18.) Even in that situation, though, the issue is still properly raised on appeal. See,
e.g., Kolar v. Cassia County, 142 Idaho 346, 354 (2005); State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho
550, 553 (1998). Either way, all of Mr. Pena’s arguments, including the cumulative
evidence argument, are properly raised in this appeal.
B.

The State’s Arguments On The Merits Of I.R.E. 404(b) Issue Represent A
Misunderstanding Of The Relevant Precedent
The State contends that the fact two officers testified they remembered seeing

Mr. Pena, on prior occasions, driving the same car in which they found the gun does
not bear on his character, and so, I.R.E. 404(b) does not apply to that testimony.
(Resp. Br., pp.10-11.) That argument is wrong for several reasons.
At the outset, it constitutes an erroneously-narrow understanding of the scope of
I.R.E. 404(b).

The scope of that rule is not limited to just direct evidence of bad

character, such as a prior conviction. See, e.g., State v. Whitaker, 152 Idaho 945, 949
(Ct. App. 2012) (explaining that I.R.E. 404(b) is not limited to acts “bad,” or acts “prior,”
to the charged conduct). Rather, as the United States Supreme Court explained in
reviewing the substantially-similar Federal Rule of Evidence (F.R.E.) 404(b), such rules
“generally prohibit[] the introduction of evidence of extrinsic acts that might adversely
reflect on the actor’s character.” Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988)
(emphasis added).1 Thus, I.R.E. 404(b) applies to evidence of the other acts which
would allow the jury to draw improper conclusions about the defendant’s character,

Idaho courts have held Huddleston’s analysis is persuasive to the understanding of
Idaho’s rules because of the similarity between Idaho’s rules and the federal rules,
including I.R.E. 404(b). See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667 n.2 (2010); see
also State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 920 (2015) (citing Huddleston with approval in the
I.R.E. 404(b) context, but without further explanation or analysis).

1

4

even if that evidence does not speak directly to the defendant’s character itself.
Whitaker, 152 Idaho at 949 (agreeing that I.R.E. 404(b) applied because “[t]his
evidence, while not evincing criminality, could be used to demonstrate poor character,”
and so, holding that, “[b]ecause the evidence implicated Whitaker’s character and was
not intrinsic to the crimes charged, it is subject to the strictures of Rule 404(b)”)
(emphasis added); cf. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009) (“The prejudicial effect of
[character evidence] is that it induces the jury to believe the accused is more likely to
have committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character.”)
(emphasis added).
Understanding the proper scope of I.R.E. 404(b), it is clear that the recognition
testimony in this case falls within the scope of that rule because it adversely speaks to
Mr. Pena’s character, inducing the jury to believe he has a propensity for criminal
conduct.

This is the point the Second Circuit was explaining in the section of the

opinion in United States v. Scott, 677 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2012), to which Mr. Pena directed
this Court’s attention in his initial brief. (See App. Br., pp.10-12.) As the Scott Court put
it, prior recognition testimony induces the jury to conclude that the repeated contacts
between the police and the defendant were “in some sense, related to his bad character
and criminal propensity.” Scott, 677 F.3d at 84.
The State contends that this Court should not consider Scott’s clear and detailed
explanation of how such evidence is unduly prejudicial under a 404(b) analysis to be
persuasive by attempting to distinguish Scott factually. (Resp. Br., pp.12-13.) However,
its argument in that regard completely misreads the Scott opinion.

First, it fails to

appreciate that Scott was addressing several distinct questions in its opinion.
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See Scott, 677 F.3d at 77-85 (breaking the opinion into three sections, one of which
was divided into three subsections). As a result, the State focuses on one part of the
analysis in one section, which addresses whether F.R.E. 404(b) applied to the
challenged evidence at all, while Mr. Pena was directing this Court to the analysis in an
entirely separate section of the opinion, one which addresses how to evaluate such
evidence under F.R.E. 404(b). (Compare Resp. Br., p.13 (citing Scott, 677 F.3d at 78);
with App. Br., p.10 (citing Scott, 677 F.3d at 84).) Second, the State’s argument ignores
the fact that the Scott Court effectively rejected the argument that Rule 404(b) does not
apply to recognition testimony by expressly renouncing the analysis on which that
argument is based. Third, the State’s argument is contrary to Idaho precedent, which
employs a rule substantially similar to the one the Scott Court adopted. See, e.g.,
Whitaker, 152 Idaho at 949. As a result, this Court should reject that argument.
Specifically, the State highlights the distinction Scott drew between the facts in
Scott and the facts of that court’s prior decision in United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d
280 (2d Cir. 1999), which the government had argued controlled the analysis in Scott.
Scott, 677 F.3d at 77.

In Lumpkin, the Second Circuit concluded that an officer’s

testimony about often seeing the co-defendant while observing an area known for drug
activity did not fall within the scope of F.R.E. 404(b) because it “does not qualify as
evidence of a crime or bad act. Put another way, nothing in [the officer’s] observations
indicates [the co-defendant] is of bad character. Therefore, [the officer’s] testimony
simply does not fall within the ambit of other crimes evidence that must be excluded
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under Rule 404(b).”2

Lumpkin, 192 F.3d at 287-88.

This is effectively the same

argument the State is championing in Mr. Pena’s case: “The fact that [Mr.] Pena had
been seen driving his car on other occasions does not bear on [Mr.] Pena’s character.
As such, it is not subject to analysis under I.R.E. 404(b).” (Resp. Br., p.10.)
Scott held that Lumpkin was not applicable for two reasons. First, the Scott
Court drew the “substantial” distinction between its facts and the facts in Lumpkin.3 In
Scott, the officers had actually made contact with the defendant, whereas, in Lumpkin,
they had only passively observed the co-defendant. Scott, 677 F.3d at 78. Taking into
account the framework of the opinion and the specific section in which that distinction
was drawn, it is clear that what the Scott Court was saying was: In regard to the
applicability of F.R.E 404(b), the facts in Scott were substantially more prejudicial than
those in Lumpkin, and therefore, F.R.E. 404(b) definitely applied in Scott. See Scott,
677 F.3d at 78.
In drawing that distinction, however, Scott did not say that the facts in Lumpkin
were not also subject to analysis under F.R.E. 404(b). In fact, this is the point the Scott
Court made as its second reason (which the State does not address) for holding that
Lumpkin was not controlling.
Scott abrogated the rule announced in Lumpkin, expressly renouncing the
narrow interpretation of F.R.E. 404(b) employed in Lumpkin:

The Lumpkin Court also explained the officer’s testimony was particularly relevant in
that case because the co-defendant was claiming he had been misidentified. Lumpkin,
192 F.3d at 288. Dissimilarly, Mr. Pena conceded the relevant point – that he was the
owner of the car. (See App. Br., pp.7-9.) That distinction further undermines the State’s
use of the Lumpkin analysis.
3 This is the only part of the Scott analysis which the State discusses in its brief. (See
generally Resp. Br.)
2
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Nothing about these words implies the “other . . . acts” to which Rule
404(b) refers must be “bad.” Indeed, to read the Rule as such violates the
cardinal principle of statutory interpretation that courts must give effect, if
possible, to every clause and word of a statute. While crimes, wrongs, or
bad acts may be more likely than other kinds of acts to demonstrate
criminal propensity and thus be inadmissible for that reason under Rule
404(b), the Rule itself is in no sense limited to such acts.
Scott, 677 F.3d at 78 (internal quotation omitted, ellipsis from original, emphasis added).
Accordingly, all such recognition testimony is subject to analysis under Rule 404(b),
though it may not necessarily be excluded under that rule.
In fact, that is the basis on which Scott ultimately distinguished the result in
Lumpkin despite abrogating the rule Lumpkin had announced. The Lumpkin Court had
articulated an alternative basis for its decision – that the recognition testimony was
“particularly relevant in a case where the [co-]defendant claimed he was misidentified.
And, we find nothing in this testimony to be unduly prejudicial.” Lumpkin, 192 F.3d at
288.

Therefore, the Scott Court distinguished the Lumpkin analysis under the

F.R.E. 404(b) framework: “a jury hearing this testimony would conclude that Scott was
a person with a propensity to engage in wrongful, criminal conduct or otherwise unusual
behavior that would attract the attention of the police, and not, as in Lumpkin, merely a
person who had been seen by a police officer at some point in his life.” Scott, 677 F.3d
at 79. Essentially, under the Scott standard, the scenario presented in Lumpkin would
also be subject to analysis under F.R.E. 404(b) because, as Scott explained, such
evidence induces the jury to believe “that [the defendant] is, at a minimum, the sort of
person who warrants a level of police observation to which law-abiding citizens are
unaccustomed,” i.e., that the defendant has a bad character. Scott, 677 F.3d at 79.
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For all those reasons, the State’s focus on the distinction between Scott and
Lumpkin fails to appreciate the full holding in Scott, and takes the distinction well
beyond the bounds of the context in which it was made.

Therefore, the State’s

argument as to why this Court should not find Scott persuasive is meritless.
Proving that point, the State’s argument against Scott runs contrary to Idaho
precedent, since Idaho’s understanding of the scope of I.R.E. 404(b) is similar to Scott’s
understanding of F.R.E. 404(b). Idaho Rule 404(b) applies to all acts not “intrinsic to”
the charged offense, whether or not they are “bad” acts or occurred “prior” to the
charged conduct. Whitaker, 152 Idaho at 949; compare Scott, 677 F.3d at 78 (“Each of
our sister Circuits to consider the issue has concluded that Rule 404(b) extends to noncriminal acts or wrongs, and we now join them.”) (internal citations omitted). As a result,
the recognition testimony relating to Mr. Pena’s other instances of driving the car is,
according to Idaho precedent, “subject to the strictures of I.R.E. 404(b).” Id.
Since Idaho precedent provides that I.R.E. 404(b) applies to the recognition
testimony in Mr. Pena’s case, Scott’s detailed explanation of the prejudice caused by
the admission of such evidence under a substantially-similar rule is useful in
understanding how I.R.E. 404(b) should operate in this case. In this case, the officers
testified to seeing Mr. Pena driving that car at least six times over the course of several
months leading up to his arrest.

(Tr., p.307, Ls.8-16, p.347, Ls.4-10; see also

Tr., p.171, Ls.2-25 (the prosecutor’s pretrial explanation of what she expected that
testimony to be).) That testimony, more so than the testimony in Lumpkin (that, while
observing an area known for drug activity, the officer had simply, but often, seen the
co-defendant), induced the jury to believe that Mr. Pena was a person with a propensity
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to engage in criminal conduct that warranted the heightened attention of the police. As
Scott put it, that evidence implies the officers “knew what he was likely to be doing—in
this case [Scott] dealing drugs. It stretches credulity to think that a jury would assume
that the defendant’s lengthy and numerous contacts with the police were not, in some
sense, related to his bad character and criminal propensity. . . . This is the essence of
prejudice.” Scott, 677 F.3d at 84. Therefore, the recognition testimony was prejudicial
in its implication of Mr. Pena’s character.
As discussed in depth in the Appellant’s Brief, that prejudice substantially
outweighed the little, if any, probative value the recognition testimony had in this case.
(App. Br., pp.7-12.) As the United States Supreme Court has explained, in cases where
the only distinction between the proffered evidence, as opposed to a stipulation to the
relevant facts,4 is the risk of prejudice in the proffered evidence, “the only reasonable
conclusion was that the risk of unfair prejudice did substantially outweigh the discounted
probative value of [the evidence], and it was an abuse of discretion to admit [the
evidence] when an admission was available.” Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172,
191 (1997) (specifically evaluating whether a record of a prior conviction was admissible
under F.R.E. 404(b)).

As a result, it was error to admit the officers’ recognition

testimony under I.R.E. 404(b) in Mr. Pena’s case.

Defense counsel’s opening statement revealed that the fact that Mr. Pena owned the
car had been conceded in this case. (See Tr., p.150, Ls.1-3, p.152, Ls.6-8; see also
Tr., p.171, Ls.11-18 (defense counsel acknowledging that concession during the
discussion in limine).

4
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C.

The State Misstated The Harmless Error Standard
The State contends that, even if the admission of the recognition testimony was

erroneous, the error was harmless, and it asserts the standard it must meet in that
regard is to show “whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have
convicted [the defendant] even without the admission of the challenged evidence.”
(Resp. Br., p.14.) That standard is rooted, as the State acknowledges, in the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999). (Resp.
Br., p.14.)
The Idaho Supreme Court has reviewed Neder as it relates to the harmless error
test in Idaho. State v. Perry, 155 Idaho 209, 223-24 (2010). It concluded that Neder is
not a separate standard for harmless error review, but rather, is an exception to the
general harmless error analysis, an exception which only applies when the alleged error
involves the jury instructions omitting an element of the offense. Id. at 223-24, 228.
Since Mr. Pena is not challenging the propriety of the elements instruction to the jury,
but rather, the district court’s ruling in limine on the admissibly of evidence of other acts
under I.R.E. 404(b), the Neder exception does not apply to this case.
In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court has, specifically in regard to a violation of
I.R.E. 404(b), expressly rejected the standard upon which the State relies:

“an

appellate court’s inquiry ‘is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty
verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually
rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1,
11 (2013) (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)) (emphasis from
Sullivan). The United States Supreme Court explained why this is the proper standard:

11

“to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact rendered—no matter how
inescapable the findings to support that verdict might be—would violate the jury-trial
guarantee.” Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279. “The most an appellate court can conclude is
that a jury would surely have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt—not
that the jury’s actual finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt would surely not have
been different absent the constitutional error.[5]

That is not enough.

The Sixth

Amendment requires more than appellate speculation about a hypothetical jury’s action
. . . .” Id. at 280 (internal citation omitted; emphasis from original). Therefore, the
standard the State advocates is wrong. As such, this Court should reject the State’s
harmless error argument.
Rather, the proper standard for determining whether a violation of I.R.E. 404(b) is
harmless is “the harmless error test articulated by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 . . . (1967).” Joy, 155 Idaho at 11;
cf. Perry, 150 Idaho at 222 (“Idaho shall from this point forward employ the Chapman
harmless error test to all objected-to error.”). “Under the two-part Chapman test, the
defendant must establish the existence of an error, ‘at which point the State shall have
the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id.
(quoting Perry, 150 Idaho at 222). “[Chapman] held that the correct standard required
appellate courts to ask ‘whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence
complained of might have contributed to the conviction.’”

Perry, 150 Idaho at 223

(quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23).

While Sullivan was applying the Chapman harmless error test to a “constitutional
error,” the Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that the Chapman test applies to all
objected-to errors, constitutional or otherwise. Perry, 150 Idaho at 222.

5

12

Applying the proper standard to Mr. Pena’s case, there is a reasonable possibility
the error contributed to the verdict actually rendered in this trial, and so, the error is not
harmless. This case comes down, primarily, to whether the jury believed Mr. Pena’s
assertion that he did not know the gun was in the car. The Idaho Supreme Court dealt
with a similar situation in Joy, where the verdict was also “primarily based upon whose
version of events the jury believes.” Joy, 155 Idaho at 11-12. Because the erroneouslyadmitted other-acts evidence in Joy impacted on that credibility determination, the
Supreme Court held “the State has not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the
verdict was ‘surely unattributable’ to the admission of irrelevant evidence.” Id. at 12.
That was particularly true because of the underwhelming nature of the State’s evidence
in that case. Id.
Similarly, apart from the points Mr. Pena actually conceded, the State’s evidence
in this case was not overly strong. After all, the jury did acquit him of the charge of
driving under the influence. (R., p.190.) Thus, as the Scott Court neatly put it: “A jury
could easily have believed [the defendant’s] version of the facts . . . and yet convicted
because of the recognition testimony.” Scott, 677 F.3d at 85. Essentially, the jury might
have been induced to believe Mr. Pena’s testimony that he did not know the gun was in
the car, and yet, found that he did unlawfully possess it based on the officers’
recognition testimony, which implicated Mr. Pena was of a character which needed to
be kept under supervision because the officers knew what he was likely to be doing –
possessing unlawful items.

Therefore, per the proper standard for harmless error

review, there is a reasonable possibility the error contributed to the jury’s verdict. Thus,
as in Joy, the State failed to meet its proper burden, meaning the error is not harmless.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Pena respectfully requests this Court vacate the judgment of conviction in
this case and remand the case for further proceedings.
DATED this 27th day of June, 2016.
___________/s/______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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